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Abstract
I present Gilbert Simondon’s thinking of technics, that I take to be so compelling 
today because it articulates technological reality in ecological terms as a technoge-
ography and life as being-with-the-machines. I will (1) flesh out Simondon’s pro-
gram for a being-with-the-machines, (2) show how it corresponds to the essence of 
the technical objects described in terms of milieu and relation (3) indicate how this 
is based on Simondon’s ontology of individuation (4) suggest a criticism of Simon-
don, insofar as he would underestimate the technicality of the human being him/
herself and of his/her world.
Keywords Simondon · Technics · Technology · Technogeography · Milieu · 
Individuation
Since some years, a promise of Simondon is in the air: All of his works are at last 
being published in French, his main works are being translated into English, and 
commentaries appear also in English.1 What is compelling today about this thinker 
of technology and of individuation that inspired for instance Deleuze, Latour, 
Stengers and Stiegler?
I think that our time is compelled by Simondon’s thinking of technological reality 
in ecological terms as a techno-geography and of life as a being-with-the-machines. 
In this article, I will outline Simondon’s program for a being-with-the-machines; 
show how it corresponds to the essence of the technical objects described in terms 
of milieu and relation; indicate how this is based on Simondon’s ontology of indi-
viduation; and suggest a criticism of Simondon, insofar as he would underestimate 
the inevitable technicality of the human being him/herself and of his/her world.
 * Susanna Lindberg 
 susanna.e.lindberg@gmail.com
1 Collegium for Advanced Studies of the University of Helsinki, University of Helsinki, Po.Box 3, 
00014 Helsinki, Finland
1 see, e.g. Parrhesia 07; de Boever et al. (2012); Scott (2014).
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(1) In Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon, Jean-Hugues Bar-
thélémy shows that Simondon thinks the technical object as support and symbol of 
the transindividual relation.2 Being the support of this relation, the object is pre-
cisely not the foundation of a community but the intermediary of transindividual 
relations. The relation it mediates is transindividual, that is to say, it does not con-
nect already constituted individuals but expresses the pre-individual reality thanks to 
which individuations can take place. But technical objects do not only enable human 
being-with: They are also something with which human beings exist, so that human 
beings are engaged in specific ways of being-with-technical objects.
In the Introduction of Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (1958), Simon-
don tells what the human being’s relation to machines should be:
The machine endowed with a high degree of technicity is an open machine, 
and all open machines taken together [l’ensemble des machines ouvertes] 
presuppose man as their permanent organizer, as the living interpreter of all 
machines among themselves. Far from being the supervisor of a group of 
slaves, man is the permanent organizer of a society of technical objects that 
need him in the same way musicians in an orchestra need the conductor. […] 
Man thus has the function of being the permanent coordinator and inventor of 
the machines that surround him. He is among the machines that operate with 
him.3
The human being is among and with machines: His/her relation to technical 
objects is not explained in terms of instrumentality but expressed in terms of com-
munity or being-with.4 This is an invitation to understand technical objects better 
than technophobic humanists and technophilic technocrats do, for they examine 
technical objects in terms of something that they are not (instruments of human 
needs/applications of scientific theories) instead of what they are in themselves. 
But this is above all an invitation to construct a better practical relation to technical 
objects.
The human being’s being with technical objects is distinct from his/her being-
with other human beings, animals or natural beings especially because the technical 
object is the mediator of other types of being-with. Throughout history, the human 
being has had different ways of being-with-the-technical-object, that Simondon pre-
sents schematically through the figures of the craftsman, the engineer, and the tech-
nician. The first two are specifically contrasted by Simondon to the attitude that he 
is promoting.
2 Barthélémy (2005, p. 142).
3 Simondon (2017, pp.17–18). Simondon’s book Du mode d’existence des objets techniques was first 
published in 1958 and reprinted in 2012. Its English translation by Cecile Malaspina and John Rogrove, 
On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, only appeared in 2017, the original page numbers are 
indicated at the margins of the translation.
4 Simondon actually rejects the term "community" (Simondon 2013, pp. 341–343). Simondon follows 
André Leroi-Gourhan’s way of thinking techniques in terms of "technical tendencies" that go over par-
ticular "communities," understood as closed ethnies, and open up a more universal "civilization" instead. 
See e.g. Leroi-Gourhan (1973, pp. 336 s.q.q).
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Firstly, the craftsman surely has an “authentic” relation to the technical object 
insofar as his/her knowledge of the “elements” of his/her work (water, earth, 
wood…) is profound and s/he masters a great number of skills that are available in 
his/her situation. At least s/he is a far more accomplished technician than a factory 
worker. Nevertheless, Simondon characterizes the craftsman’s situation as “infancy” 
of technique: the craftsman has learned his/her craft by doing, s/he has learned it 
unconsciously and unreflectively like the child learns to walk and talk, and this 
is why it is difficult for her/him to transfer his/her skills into other situations or to 
invent new crafts.5 On the contrary, reflexivity and the ensuing plasticity character-
ize the “adult” relation to technique, that is most visible in the engineer. (In the con-
text of education, Simondon’s understanding of infancy is clearly outdated6 but here 
this is irrelevant, since he refers to the terms “minority” and “majority” as they are 
used by Kant in “What is Enlightenment?”)
Secondly, the engineer is not the perfect technician either, since in the modern 
industrial world s/he is often just as alienated as the factory worker and the capital-
ist, who figure alienation from work in the first place.7 None of them relates to the 
technical object as such, but only in function of its economical value. Simondon crit-
icizes alienation in the industrial world in another way than Heidegger8 and Marx9: 
Against their claim that technique alienates man,10 Simondon claims that modern 
alienation is man’s alienation from the machine and the machine’s own alienation of 
what it can really do and how it can evolve towards new uses.
Thirdly, the authentic technician’s role is to overcome both the infancy (pre-
industrial society) and the alienation (industrial society) by learning to live with 
the machines. The technician is the “pure individual,” whose task is above all to 
understand machines.11 Firstly, s/he interprets and invents machines. The machine 
shouldn’t be for him/her a “black box” whose input and output are known but whose 
functioning remains mysterious:12 A real technician understands the functioning 
of technical objects and invents new ways of functioning. Secondly, s/he shouldn’t 
direct machines from above: “Technical life, however, does not consist in overseeing 
machines, but in existing at the same level as a being that takes charge of the rela-
tion between them, capable of being coupled, simultaneously or successively, with 
several machines.”13 Instead of merely directing machines, s/he should interpret and 
5 Simondon (2017, pp. 106–109).
6 see e.g. Simondon (2014, pp. 43–46, 203–232).
7 Simondon (2017, pp. 134, 140–141).
8 Simondon accuses Heidegger of analyzing alienation only in terms of the "use" of the Zeug (Simon-
don 2017: 230; Simondon 2014: 31). Simondon’s interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking of technology 
is insufficient, because he only pays heed to Being and Time. On Simondon’s relation to Heidegger, see 
Vaysse (2006), Combes (2006), and Barthélémy (2015, pp. 47–71).
9 Simondon accuses Marx of analyzing alienation only in terms of "work" (Simondon 2017, p. 231; 
Simondon 2014, pp. 54 s.q.q.).
10 Xavier Guchet presents the general debate on man’s enslavement by the macine at the time of the 
preparation of Du mode d’existence des objets techniques in Guchet (2010, pp. 133–136).
11 Simondon (2013, pp. 340–341).
12 Combes (2006).
13 Simondon (2017, p. 140).
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translate them to one another so as to construct better technical ensembles, milieux 
and “techno-geographic milieus”—techno-geographic milieu being the simultane-
ously technological and geographical milieu that the object projects as its condi-
tion.14 Thirdly, s/he should interpret machines to “artists and thinkers” and to all 
who find themselves ignorant about machines,15 and in this sense fulfil a social role 
as well. Simondon’s searching for the authentic technician sometimes looks like 
calling forth new specialists rather than democratizing technological competences, 
but this impression must be nuanced. Finally, the aim of technical thinking is the 
invention of new ways of being-with-other-people as well:
Technical thought is present in all technical activity, and technical thought is 
of the order of invention; it can be communicated; it authorizes participation. 
[…] The technical object insofar as it has been invented, thought and willed, 
and taken up by a human subject, becomes the medium [support] and symbol 
of this relation ship, which we would like to name transindividual.16
Here we see how the genuine technological community becomes a model of 
being-with-others that, according to Simondon, should be neither collective nor 
intersubjective but “transindividual.” A “transindividual” relation to other people 
is not a collective submission to a single principe, nor an intersubjective relation 
between already constituted individuals, but a transindividual relation in which indi-
vidualisation is perpetuated from an individual to another laterally.17
A pure technician “respects” the technical object.18 Through him/her, the object 
is “liberated” and even “saved” from its “enslavement” to pure utility (the idea of 
“salvation” of technical object is presented in an interview with Anne Kéhickian 
“Sauver l’objet technique”19). No more a “black box,” it ceases to be a “closed 
machine” that refuses all modifications, and becomes an “open machine” that can be 
repaired, transformed and used as material for new inventions: The “authentic tech-
nical object” is free to evolve.20
(2) The technical object as such is a relation and a being-with,21 and this is 
precisely why it can be “free,” “open” and “authentic.” Simondon presents the 
19 Simondon (2014, pp. 447–454).
20 Simondon celebrates concrete manual work with machines and speaks with genuine joy of building tv 
sets and other machines with schoolchildren. In this regard, he has a similar mentality as Matthew Craw-
ford in his Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry Into the Value of Work, Penguin Press (2009), although 
philosophically Crawford rather reminds of Thoreau, not of Simondon.
21 "Without a doubt, the ontological postulate, or rather, the ontogenetic postulate, central to a philoso-
phy of individuation, is that individuals consist in relations, and as a consequence, relation has the status 
of being and constitutes being" (Combes 2013, p. 21). See also Jean-Hugues Barthélémy’s Simondon 
which is a very good presentation of Simondon’s philosophy in general as a philosophy of relation, see in 
particular Barthélémy (2014, pp. 79–94).
14 Simondon (2017, p. 58).
15 Simondon (2017, pp. 162–163).
16 Simondon (2017, p. 252).
17 Chateau (2008, pp. 57–61).
18 Simondon (2014, p. 204).
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relationality of technical objects both through the history of technology and in 
abstract philosophical terms.
Actually Simondon starts his history of technologies from biology. Following the 
ethological and the ecological tradition that originates from the works of Jacob von 
Uexküll, Simondon thinks technical reality as a mode of the type of relation that a 
living being has to its milieu.22 It may go without saying that simple tools and instru-
ments constitute mediations between human beings and their milieux23 (or animals 
and their milieux, Simondon does not exclude animal technologies). But particularly 
the history of human technologies shows that the technical object is also a relation 
in itself. More interesting for Simondon than simple tools are complicated technical 
objects like apparatuses and machines that function by themselves by reacting and 
relating to their own functioning through various mechanisms of auto-regulation and 
auto-correlation. Of course, such automats were first studied in cybernetics—but 
Simondon thinks that Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics is too limited a theory because 
it examines automats too exclusively as if they were entirely closed systems while, 
in reality, a pure automat does not exist, because all technical objects are embedded 
in their technogeographical milieus with which they exchange information.24 It is 
remarkable that already in 1968–1969, for instance in his lecture course L’invention 
et le développement des techniques, he presents as the most advanced and interesting 
kind of technology the information and telecommunication technologies that func-
tion through “programs” and are organised as “networks” between “terminals,” that 
modulate the “texture” of the original milieu, and core elements that “represent for 
the first time pure technicity”.25 Such networks are of course essentially relational 
entities: The solitary material terminal (telephone, TV set, computer) separated 
from the network is practically useless.
In abstract philosophical terms, any technical object is firstly a relation with 
itself. It is a being-with-itself in its functioning, because by functioning it relates to 
itself. For Simondon, the technical object is not a material thing but a functioning: 
“The machine is a being that functions”.26 The technical object is not the double of 
the human hand but of the action made by the hand: “What resides in the machines 
is human reality, human gesture fixed and crystallized into working structures 
[structures qui fonctionnent]”27 or “The machine is a deposited fixed human gesture 
that has become a stereotypy and the power to restart”.28 The functioning technical 
object also relates to itself, for instance when its fabricant and user gradually adapt 
it to specific tasks. “The technical being evolves through convergence and self-adap-
tion: It unifies itself internally according to a principle of inner resonance.”29
22 Simondon (2005, p. 85), and Introduction by Chateau to Simondon (2005, p. 50).
23 Simondon (2005, p. 89).
24 Simondon (2005, pp. 89, 93, 94), Simondon (2017, p. 51).
25 Simondon (2005, pp. 98–101).
26 Simondon (2017, p. 151).
27 Simondon (2017, p. 18).
28 Simondon (2017, p. 151).
29 Simondon (2017, p. 26).
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Secondly, the technical object has a historical being-with-other-objects when it 
relates to other objects of its “lineage.” The “individual technical object is not this 
or that thing, given hic et nunc, but that of which there is genesis”:30 It is its genesis. 
The genesis of a technical object is the genesis of an entire lineage through which a 
“technical essence” gradually evolves. Technical objects exist as phylogenetic lines 
that deploy a kind of a history that starts by invention, not of a thing, but of a techni-
cal function, and not as a definite solution, but as a possible response to a problem. 
Simondon does not think invention primarily as man’s act but as inventivity that 
comes from the object itself: This is why its openness is so important. From then 
on, the technical object evolves by engendering new variants of the same principle 
or by incorporating the principle into new combinations. Simondon understands the 
technical object “through phenomena for which it is in itself the basis: This is where 
its fecundity comes from, a non-saturation giving it posterity” […] “One could say 
that the technical object evolves by generating a family: The primitive object is the 
ancestor of this family. Such evolution could be called a natural technical evolu-
tion”.31 However, biology only provides an analogy and actually Simondon forbids 
to confound the technical object with a living being.32 Technical evolution is bet-
ter compared to memory, so that technical memory conserves and repeats whatever 
contents are registered in it—while human memory forgets contents but is capable 
of recovering forms and introducing new codes.33 Even the “open machine” that 
allows new codings needs to receive these from humans.
The evolution of a technical object is its “concretization.” A “primitive” techni-
cal object is “abstract:” An abstract object might be, for instance, a custom-made 
object that functions only in given circumstances. Concretized objects’ elements fit 
together with other objects and function with them. Through concretization, they 
“prove the viability and the stability of a certain structure which has the same status 
as a natural structure:” It becomes the real world. The technical objet is no more 
world’s artificial ornament but its supporting element.
Even though technical objects are gradually worn, corroded and deformed, they 
cannot die or be destroyed (persons and works of art can, because they are unique, 
while technical objects are replaceable instances of a type). Instead, a technical 
essence can become obsolete. In the lecture course Psychosociologie de la tech-
nicité, Simodon examines different aspects of obsolescence of technical objects. He 
thinks that technical objects are alienated and reduced to slavery when a perfectly 
functional machine is made obsolescent by extra-technical causes.34 On the contrary, 
30 ibid., p. 26.
31 ibid., p. 45, 46.
32 ibid., p. 50.
33 ibid., pp. 135–138. Simondon’s idea of technique has been interpreted as a kind of memory especially 
by Stiegler (1994, p. 81 s.q.q.). In living beings, memory is structured as mental schemes that can cana-
lise action, but these structures are at the same time metastable and therefore changing. On the one hand, 
memory schemes are incorporated solutions to past problems, and on the other hand, encounter with an 
individuating event enables invention that modifies existing schemes. (Morizot 2016, p. 162–187). In the 
case of technical objects, evolution generally concerns technical essences, not individual objects.
34 Simondon (2014, pp. 54–62).
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an open machine can be repaired, its elements can be used in other technical ensem-
bles: As long as its essence is non-saturated, it is fecund of new inventions.
Thirdly, the technical object is a spatial being-with-other-objects (and beings). It 
cannot be examined in isolation, because it is always a part of a world which con-
sists of a natural site, of a social context, of economical conditions, of a technologi-
cal environment, etc. Like all other objects, technical objects have a milieu and only 
make sense in the milieu. Furthermore, they open the milieu that the human being 
shares with other human, natural and technical beings.
The technical object “can adapt to the material and human conditions of produc-
tion […] it can then adapt to the task for which it is made.”35 It has a double relation 
to its surroundings because it relates both to natural conditions and to a technical 
environment and is their point of encounter. The human being’s task is to invent the 
best possible compromise between the two worlds, and an advanced technology is 
characterized by the high adaptation of the technical world into the natural world.36
Adaptation-concretization is a process that conditions the birth of a milieu 
rather than being conditioned by an already given milieu; it is conditioned by 
a milieu that only exists virtually before invention; there is invention because 
there is a leap that takes place and is justified by means of the relation that it 
brings about within the milieu that it creates; […] One could say that the con-
cretizing invention realizes a techno-geographic milieu […] which in turn is 
a condition of possibility of the technical object’s functioning. The technical 
object is thus its own condition, as a condition of existence of this mixed milieu 
which is simultaneously both technical and geographical.37
Simondon calls “associated milieu” the techno-natural milieu that the technical 
objects create or project as their own elemental ground.38 Through the notion of 
the associated milieu Simondon defines the three modes of existence of the techni-
cal object, namely being as element, as individual and as ensemble. The technical 
individual is the proper incarnation of a technical essence; Simondon’s own exam-
ple is a Guimbal turbine, but to avoid lengthy technical explications, I choose an 
easier example—a piano. Simondon says that principally a technical individual is 
invented and has an “associated milieu,”39 for instance a concert hall. “We shall 
speak of a technical individual whenever the associated milieu exists as a condi-
tion of functioning sine qua non, whereas it is an ensemble in the contrary case.”40 
The technical element is only a part, like the hammer of a piano. It does not have 
its own “associated milieu,” and this is probably why it can be detached from the 
individual and eventually incorporated into a different technical individual (hence 
the discontinuities of technical evolution). “It is thus within elements that technicity 
37 ibid., p. 68.
38 ibid., p. 59, see also ibid., p. 208.
39 ibid., pp. 59, 73.
40 ibid., p. 63.
35 Simondon (2017, p. 53).
36 ibid., pp. 55–56.
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exists in the purest way, in a free state as it were, whereas in the individual or the 
ensemble, technicity only exists in a state of combination,”41 In elements, technicity 
exists therefore as a “transductive propriety” that can be transferred from an object 
to another. The technical ensemble does not have an “associated milieu:” It is a set 
of machines that operate together thanks to human coordination. There is a circula-
tion between individual, element and ensemble: The individual is invented (piano), 
not out of nothing but out of available elements that carry the technicity of an epoch 
(hammers, strings). Thanks to the elements technicity can be transferred from an 
individual to another, and it is this transduction of elements rather than the sole act 
of inventing technical inventions that makes technical evolution possible.
(3) Simondon intends this “phenomenology”42 of the technical object as a major 
example of the ontology of individuation that he exposes in L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information—but the main reference of this book 
is biology—and Du mode d’existence des objets techniques does not explain its rela-
tion to L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information. I can-
not expose the ontology of individuation here in any detail, but for those who are 
already familiar with it, and also to indicate a direction of further research, I give a 
very brief outline of the reasons for which the technical object illustrates the main 
principles of this ontology.43 Inversely, the ontology of individuation explains the 
mode of being of technical objects.
Simondon’s thinking of individuation is a thinking of real genetic transforma-
tion that is directed against atomism and hylomorphism. As Combes shows in her 
groundlaying book Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, 
Simondon thinks individuation as a process in function of a preindividual being, 
which he defines against the idea of a unitary, identical Being as an excessive, meta-
stable dimension of potentialities that can lead to different individuations without 
exhausting the preindividual.44
Accordingly, the technical essence does not precede technical objects, but 
invention is an ongoing process that happens gradually in the course of technical 
41 ibid., p.  74.
42 Simondon’s approach resembles phenomenology but he does not use the term himself, and speaks 
of a genealogical method instead. On these terms and their difference, see Chateau (2010). In a useful 
comparision of Simondon with Merleau-Ponty, Andrea Bardin resumes the difference between phenom-
enology and Simondon’s thinking as follows: “[F]rom Simondon’s perspective, even the more advanced 
of Merleau-Ponty’s attempts cannot avoid the presupposition of sense. […] Simondon, on the contrary, 
renews the concept of information in order to relegate perception, signification and sense to the domain 
of psychic and collective individuation, making them depend on ontogenesis itself and thus abandoning 
the phenomenological hierarchy still implicit in the choice of the term ‘perception’.” Bardin (2015, p. 
42).
43 For a more thorough presentation of the ontology of individuation see Combes 2013; Scott 2014; 
Grosz 2012; Sauvagnargues 2012. Sauvagnargues’s interpretation is important also because she indi-
cates how Simondon’s thinking has passed on to Deleuze. However, according to Barthélémy (2014, pp. 
187–191), Deleuze has misinterpreted Simondon because he interprets Simondon’s ontological field as 
a pre-personal transcendental field. The difference between Deleuze and Simondon would therefore be 
analogical to the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Simondon: Simondon is interested in ontological 
questions rather than epistemological ones, and this is why he does not study the constitution of subjec-
tivity but the individuation that precedes any type of existence, including subjectivity.
44 Combes (2013, pp. 2–9).
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evolution. Actually there are no (technical) individuals but only processes of indi-
viduation. All (technical) objects are “metastable,” that is to say they contain asym-
metrical disequilibrium which causes tension and demands the invention of new 
solutions of equilibrium. A metastable situation projects a “pre-individual” situation 
in which invention happens: The pre-individual is a “materialist” ground (fond) that 
mustn’t be understood as a metaphysical arche-matter but as a situation of dynamic 
possibilities that appear as differences, tensions, problems. This is well illustrated 
by technical invention which does not happen ex nihilo but by answering to concrete 
problems by new arrangements of elements that are already available in its “asso-
ciative milieu.” The elements themselves are not positive building blocks, but pro-
cesses of “disparation,” that is to say processes that repeat previous processes with a 
slight difference, thanks to which the eruption of the new becomes possible. This is 
how metastable processes pass by “transduction” to new individuals, “transduction” 
being a process in which an activity continues itself in its immediate vicinity by 
working and organising neighboring regions and by creating, in this way, new indi-
viduals that are similarly provisional unities of heterogeneous elements. Contrary to 
induction and deduction, transduction is not a theoretical mastery of a situation but 
an imaginative way of solving practical problems by transferring old elements into 
new individuals and by hereby changing the elements themselves.
All technical objects are “metastable,” provisional beings. The technical lineages 
evolve through transductive events by integrating and transforming pre-individual 
elements into new technical individuals—which remain quite as problematic, provi-
sional and changing as the preceding ones.
4) To end, I will outline a critizism of Simondon, insofar as he would underesti-
mate the technicality of the human being him/herself and of his/her world, as well as 
its consequences to his ideal of knowledge.
Simondon opens the “black box” of technique wonderfully, but does he see the 
technicity of the human being him/herself? Of course, in his time, contemporary 
anthropotechnies (gene therapies, transplants, etc.) hardly existed, while they are 
becoming very important today. However, the point is not to discard Simondon’s 
thinking together with the technologies that he studied, but to ask if his philosophy 
helps us to understand later techniques as well: If Gilbert Hottois is right in noting 
that Simondon does not really help in the understanding of contemporary anthropo-
technics,45 this is not because he did not know of such technological possibilities but 
because his conception of humanity remains fairly traditional.
For instance Bernard Stiegler allows us to understand the philosophical roots 
of this. He has suggested that Simondon postulates a magical pretechnical origin 
of humanity, while there are good reasons to follow Leroi-Gourhan, instead, and 
define humanity as originarily technical.46 As a consequence of this, Simondon 
would end by presenting contemporary alienation as if it were a provisional state 
of affairs that could be overcome thanks to the work of authentic technicians who 
invent authentic machines that constitute a positive technogeographic milieu. 
45 Hottois (2002, pp. 98–100).
46 Stiegler (2006, pp. 325–341).
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According to Barthélémy, this reading is only possible because Stiegler would inter-
pret On the mode of existence of technical objects in the sense of a history of culture 
while it ought to be read as genetic eidetics.47 While this can be maintained in the 
case of On the mode…,48 the lecture course Psychosociologie de la technicité indi-
cates that Simondon thinks technics and sacrality also in terms of their history.49 
Stiegler thinks that Simondon’s concepts are not sufficient to understand contem-
porary world which would be overdetermined by the increasing alienation of wo/
men caused by the overwhelming presence of factually alienated technique.50 Muriel 
Combes makes a parallel criticism when she says that Simondon fails to think tool-
less techniques that aim at particular forms of subjectivation and of transformation 
of self and world.51 Combes’ examples are ascetic and shamanistic techniques of 
the self, but I think that the remark should be extended to techniques of the self in 
general, not only to the consciously built techniques described by Foucault, but to all 
habit-based skills starting from walking and talking.52 It seems to me that since the 
very beginning the human being is his/her first instrument, and because s/he does 
not invent this instrumentality alone but acquires it transindividually, his/her rela-
tion to it can never be entirely conscious, authentic, masterful. Linguistic or musical 
skills give excellent examples of this: Learning to speak a new language or to play 
an instrument is a transductive process that consists both of an “infantile” formation 
of a kind of an instinct and of an “adult” reflection on the process. It could be shown 
that one could never learn a language by applying seriously Simondon’s theory of 
education, which is based on a clear distinction between irreflective infancy and 
reflective maturity.53
Among Simondon’s most compelling ideas is his description of a techno-geo-
graphic milieu that allows to overcome the rigid opposition between a natural site 
and a technological context thanks to the mediation of the object. Indeed, in the 
contemporary world it seems increasingly impossible to draw a sharp line between 
nature and technology, for the two have merged into a single techno-nature in which 
nature is conditioned by technique as much as the technique by nature. But how 
47 Barthélémy (2014, p. 167, 2016).
48 Simondon (2017, p. 167).
49 Simondon (2014, pp. 73–129).
50 Alienation is for Simondon essentially the alienation of the technical object itself. "A control panel 
and command buttons are enough in an alienated machine" (Simondon 2014, p. 69) while the user can 
see, understand and even modify the functioning of an open machine. Now, is it sure that we want to see 
to the functioning of all the machines that we use? Don’t we on the contrary ask for ever simpler cell 
phones and laptops so that we can precisely forget about their functioning? Simondon and Stiegler have 
good reasons for saying that alienated machines are out of our control and actually control us: But is a 
truly authentic machine possible? Or if not, are we condamned to the monstruous task of trying to deter-
mine a tolerable degree of alienation?
51 Combes (2006, p. 98).
52 For André Leroi-Gourhan, the tool is the origin of man, and the tool is possible because of the upright 
position and short face, that is to say, as soon as man walks and talks. See p. ex. Leroi-Gourhan (1964, 
pp. 32 s.q.q., 129). Simondon knew Leroi-Gourhan’s earlier works and appreciated them. Perhaps Du 
mode d’existence des objets techniques would have been anthropologically richer had he been able to 
read Le Geste et la parole that was published only in 1964.
53 Simondon (2017, pp. 103–127, 2014, pp. 203–254). See also Hottois (2002, p. 94).
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does one live in the techno-geographic milieu? Writing mainly from the 60’s to the 
80’s, Simondon criticizes both the underestimation of technique by the ruling class 
educated only to humanities, and the alienation of technique by a ruling class edu-
cated only to economics, but he actually does not deal with the techno-geographical 
reality itself as a political place, the organisation of which could be a matter of com-
mon interest. In the last part of Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, he only 
suggests, tentatively (and in my opinion meekly), that the important technological 
“points of convergence” (“point de reticulation,” like the Eiffel tower) organise 
public space like the important religious “points of convergence” (like a cathedral) 
organise religious space, and that the former should be regarded in similar terms as 
the latter.
Only in the résumé of a lecture course from 1980 Art et nature Simondon extends 
his reflection to ecological considerations.54 In this text, he affirms the finitude of 
man and criticizes short-sighted faith in infinite progress. He singles out nuclear 
power as a particularly dangerous way of jeopardizing human future. Nevertheless 
he is opposed to the kind of ecology that turns its back to technique and thinks that 
the repairing of dangerous technogeographical situations is essentially a technical 
challenge. I think that Simondon, evaluating the situation only from the point of 
view of the human beings’ right and wrong decisions, does not pay sufficient atten-
tion to the proper potential of destruction of a technogeographical situation itself. 
All catastrophies that have their origin in technology are not man-made, or at least 
not intended by man (for instance the climatic change55). Also, the possibility of a 
properly natural or even cosmological catastrophy is a part of a techno-geographic 
milieu.
Simondon gives a very useful description of our life with technical objects in 
a techno-geographic milieu. However, he fails to take into account an evasive and 
uncontrollable aspect of technique, because of which technique will always be both 
“danger” and “salvation.”
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